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“Now I’m happy for a time and 
interested”: a state of being “inter-
ested,” a disposition to prefer one 
thing to another, replaces definite 
interests and consistent prefer-
ences . . . . He’s shopping without 
a list.”1
Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project 
(Passagenwerk, 1927–40) led read-
ers into the dream underside of 
everyday life in the heyday of 
bourgeois capitalism. Benjamin’s 
high modernist notebook assumes 
both a comfort with formal gesture 
and the antisocial solitude of the 
European high literary reader of 
the early twentieth century, a per-
son comfortable with the indirec-
tion of posited and disconnected 
things at the level of the text. Sianne 
Ngai’s Our Aesthetic Categories sim-
ilarly plunges her reader into the 
dream underside of everyday life 
in our heyday of global capitalism, 
but hers is a plain style that feels 
personal, comfortable, and fluid—
almost chatty. True to her training 
with Stanley Cavell, her style is at 
home in the ordinary, not wander-
ing as the flâneur in the extraor-
dinary. Hers is an approachable, 
infectious book, written around 
a set of tightly argued theses. Yet, 
Our Aesthetic Categories is an heir-
ess of the Arcades Project.
Like Ngai, Benjamin thought 
we can unlock the meaning of quo-
tidian things from the perspective 
of the tensions generated in them 
through their relation to the formal 
causes of capitalism. It may seem 
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liberates us by showing us how to 
read objects, so Ngai might show 
us the direction to liberate ourselves 
by helping us read our judgments. 
Hers is a fascinating combina-
tion of critical theory with Cavell’s 
focus on Kantian aesthetics, and, 
although she does not mention 
Hannah Arendt, her approach 
would be worthy of Arendt’s work 
from Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) 
on. Arendt ended her life working 
on Immanuel Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment (Critik der Urtheilskraft, 
1790), wanting to understand—
after Adolf Eichmann’s banal 
evil—how people keep alive a 
sense of meaning in the absence of 
clear rules to guide us. Ngai argues 
that in today’s round of capitalist 
restructuring—a period stretch-
ing roughly from the onset of 
post-Fordism to today, but whose 
aesthetic judgments were forming 
from the end of the Second World 
War on—three forms of aesthetic 
judgment betray the formal con-
tradictions of being a subject in 
capitalism. These three forms help 
us grasp where and how we are. 
Yet they are all so minor or para-
doxical as to be aliens to the high 
tradition of post-Kantian aesthet-
ics with its emphasis on the beau-
tiful and the sublime. They are 
alien to Kant’s inheritors in twen-
tieth-century art criticism at the 
time of high American modern-
ism—for example, surrounding 
the New York School and Clement 
Greenberg. Nonetheless, not only 
strange to invoke the Aristotelian 
notion of formal cause to explain 
Benjamin’s work, but one of his core 
assumptions is that the dynamics of 
capitalism literally form the way 
things appear in our world, straight 
down to their contradictions—and 
to the utopian possibility of over-
turning them. The mass-manu-
factured angel that even a poor 
wretch could buy under the trans-
lucent glass of an arcade in the 8th 
arrondissement grants a small piece 
of forgetting to end the long day of 
work and to assuage the children 
who sense their parents’ anxiety 
over the next rent due. This forget-
ting is also a reminder of the higher 
order of noncalculative things once 
solid, now melting into air. Yet the 
manufactured quality of the trin-
ket reduces its dreams to clichés. 
Stamped on the product is the for-
mal quality of capitalism: exhaust-
ing what it can use, spreading its 
wares to all, dividing and main-
taining class distinctions, reducing 
the order of what is in itself good, 
and deadening ideals through the 
appearance of their alienation from 
us.2 Benjamin’s brilliance is to teach 
a way of experiencing everyday 
objects that includes their wider 
productive context, social relations 
and all.
Ngai’s thesis is that our forms 
of judgment similarly betray the 
formal causes of capitalism in our 
current round of global restruc-
turing. She thinks our minds are 
made up, too. Yet, just as Benjamin 
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of being potentially powerful over 
things when we are often actually 
at their mercy. Taking something 
as cute displays a caste of mind that 
has internalized the contradictory 
nature of commodities in contem-
porary capitalism: these objects 
matter to the market more than we 
do, but, in order to extract value 
from people, they must appear 
helpless and affectionate, recalling a 
more humanized way of life while 
allowing us to feel that we could 
participate in dominating, that we 
are agents rather than victims.
Interesting
To Ngai, to claim that something 
is interesting is to insert oneself into 
the logic of circulation.4 Marking 
something as interesting makes 
discourse itself circulate, mirroring 
the underlying flux of capitalist cir-
culation, a world where everything 
is sought as a potential source of 
value and where “everything solid 
melts into air” in a general mix-
ing of meanings around the globe. 
The contradiction in the mentality 
of the interesting is found in the 
possibility that whatever is inter-
esting could be merely interest-
ing—that is, not really interesting 
at all. With the aesthetic category 
of the interesting, Ngai identi-
fies the opportunism of subjects in 
scoring value or being able to walk 
away from their failure to attract 
interest. Moreover, she locates the 
do these minor judgments reveal 
our present situation, but they con-
tain the possibility of being radi-
calized in ways that can liberate 
subjects within the very conditions 
of our alienation.3 The three forms 
of judgment are the cute, the inter-
esting, and the zany. By showing 
how we have shifted from major 
to minor in common sensibilities, 
they help us consider how we have 
been thrown back on ourselves 




According to Ngai, to think that 
something is cute is to make an aes-
thetic judgment that displays the 
contradictory nature of commodifi-
cation in contemporary capitalism. 
Things taken to be cute cover over 
our social disconnection from each 
other in a highly competitive and 
individualized world through the 
sentimental promise of affection 
and—at the same time—allow us 
to retain a surplus of power over 
the cute object. That gives us a way 
to feel the potential of dominating 
something without thinking that 
we are being dominating. In other 
words, to judge that something is 
cute is both to push away that we 
have become objects in capitalism, 
recalling for an instant the warmth 
of affection, and to have the illusion 
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hyperbolic activity is potentially 
self-destructive. Finding her over 
the top—insanely productive and 
bad news—one might hold her 
at bay, isolate her, by calling her 
zany. Zaniness is a stigmatizing 
judgment. What it allows a sub-
ject to do is both to recognize the 
hyperbolic pressures to perform 
even against one’s comfort zone 
and to give oneself an out around 
those whose efforts make their 
lives implode—not an uncommon 
class of people in the labor force 
(academics not excluded). As with 
the cute and the interesting, the 
mentality of those who judge oth-
ers zany displays a defensiveness 
around capitalism’s formal con-
tradictions. Here lives the aesthet-
ics of the defended.
* * *
Ngai’s work offers a signifi-
cant advance in the tradition of 
Benjamin, because it explores the 
way mind mirrors world. To exam-
ine the utopian contradictions of 
the object, as Benjamin did, is not 
to delineate how the mind mir-
rors the object-world. Ngai begins 
to do that through her analysis of 
forms of judgment. And more than 
simply mirroring the object, her 
account accommodates some of the 
most dominant forms of the entire 
economy: commodification, valu-
ing (or value liquidity), and labor.
ambivalence and precariousness of 
the oscillation between value and 
valuelessness, the risk of collapse in 
value that characterizes the speed-
ily circulating logic of capitalism 
with its urgent opportunism and 
global shuffling. The mindedness 
of those who rely on the interesting 
is an opportunistic form of defen-
siveness, allowing them to flicker 
around a potentially attractive 
site of meaning only to withdraw 
quickly if it fails to attract, like a 
snake smelling with its tongue.
Zany
Whereas the cute displays a mind 
mirroring the contradictions of 
commodification and the inter-
esting displays a mind mirror-
ing the opportunism of valuing 
that accelerates the circulation of 
value-seeking around the globe, 
to call something zany is to enter 
into the contradictions of con-
temporary capitalist labor, or 
what Ngai calls “performance.” 
According to Ngai, objects and 
people can be cute or interest-
ing, but only people can be zany. 
Zaniness is a judgment about 
agency. When we find, for exam-
ple, Lucy from I Love Lucy (1951–
57) zany, we recognize in her both 
the hyperbolic pressure to per-
form at an absurdly high level of 
productivity or effectiveness and 
the possibility that her life is an 
imminent train wreck, that her 
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characteristics of life-with-com-
modities in contemporary capital-
ism. This interpretation does not 
exclude that there are other possible 
ways of interpreting what’s under 
question, but shows the usefulness 
of the interpretation to helping us 
navigate our form of life.
A similar pattern shapes her last 
two chapters on the merely inter-
esting and on zaniness. The central 
focus of her chapter on the inter-
esting is an extended discussion of 
the rise of conceptual art in the late 
1960s. And the central focus of her 
chapter on the zany is the depiction 
of over-the-top comedic characters 
in contemporary mass media—
from Lucille Ball in the still rerun-
ning I Love Lucy or Richard Pryor’s 
character in The Toy (1982) to Jim 
Carrey’s The Cable Guy (1996) or 
Crazy Eddie. As a setup, too, Ngai 
gives an abbreviated genealogy of 
the zanni, the character from come-
dia dell’arte that gave us the idea 
of zaniness. Along the way, we are 
treated to a circus of philosophers, 
literary critics, poets, artists, and 
social theorists. Sometimes, the 
parade is merely interesting; more 
often, it borders on being zany, but 
mainly it is fascinating.
The book concludes with an 
afterword, not a conclusion, since 
Ngai’s chapters have adequately 
shown her introductory theses to 
be plausible and effective. Here, 
Ngai takes stock of aesthetic theory 
today and argues that contem-
porary aesthetic experience is not 
Flow of the Chapters
Ngai’s introduction lays out a 
clearly delineated thesis, spends 
some time defining her three aes-
thetic categories, and locates her 
work within both the tradition of 
postmodern cultural criticism and 
the lineage of Cavellian explora-
tions of judgment. As I’ve already 
said, I find that her work—while 
clearly drawing on what she 
learned from Cavell about Kant’s 
account of judgment—is actually 
better suited to Arendt.
Each of the three main chapters 
of Ngai’s book illuminates in depth 
one of her aesthetic categories. Her 
first chapter on the cute examines 
the concept and its history through 
a hilarious argument by which 
she shows how the avant-garde 
is indebted to the cute. Ranging 
from everyday children’s toys (with 
pictures) to the history of dolls 
in the late nineteenth century to 
Takashi Murakami’s DOB figures 
that explode into violence, Ngai 
explores the claims about the cute 
that I rehearsed earlier with run-
ning dialogue ranging from J. L. 
Austin to Theodor Adorno, Karl 
Schlegel, and Kant to Karl Marx, 
Fredric Jameson, and Benjamin 
to Gertrude Stein, Robert Creeley, 
and William Carlos Williams. By 
interpreting disparate cultural phe-
nomena, she shows that, indeed, 
the judgment that something is 
cute appears to mirror some impor-
tant and contradictory formal 
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of making, not an experience. 
Consequently, to approach objects 
through the analysis of forms of 
experience is not to approach art. 
It’s to do something else—social–
economic critique, in Ngai’s case.
Still, Ngai’s approach is wel-
come because of how it helps us 
understand ourselves in our social 
and economic contradictions. It 
also helps us tarry with the nega-
tive. Ngai’s aesthetics has the merit 
of acknowledging—to use Cavell’s 
word—the dense conflict in com-
monly shared forms of mind and 
life and in trying to understand, 
very much as Arendt did, under 
what conditions people might be 
able to have independent minds 
keyed to common life and its main, 
social challenges. In this way, Ngai 
has done work to help us further 
understand the banality of evil, a 
world where suffering is “inter-
esting” and masochism is “cute,” 
where pathetic self-destruction is 
“zany.”
Avoiding Commitment
My only substantial criticism is 
this: in examining the forms of 
mindedness that mirror the econ-
omy of contemporary capitalism, 
Ngai neglects the role of moral 
subjectivity. Ngai draws us a com-
pelling portrait of contemporary 
consciousness while missing the 
extent to which she has also shown 
barren—as those who remain wed-
ded to the centrality of the beautiful 
and the sublime might think—but 
rather that aesthetic theory is. Ngai 
wants to diversify aesthetic theory 
through marginal and actual cat-
egories of everyday judgment. 
Although she doesn’t call it such, 
this is inching toward Georg Hegel 
after Kant, toward the analysis of a 
concrete community and its inter-
twined, axiological forms. Good 
stuff.
Other Uses of the Aesthetic
Of course, Ngai’s neo-Kantian 
work is not the only kind of work 
in aesthetics today. Ngai seems 
unaware of a number of cogent 
critiques of the entire notion of 
the aesthetic, whether Karsten 
Harries’s historical deconstruction 
of aesthesis in The Ethical Function 
of Architecture (1998) or the most 
conceptually compelling work I’ve 
encountered on the meaning of art, 
Lauren Tillinghast’s work, found 
in her dissertation “The Thought 
of Art” (2000) and in a few select 
essays she wrote before becoming a 
philosophical counselor. Tillinghast 
argues, convincingly, that to call 
something “art” invokes a logi-
cal category similar to the kind of 
“gear switch” Michael Thompson 
explores in relation to life, action, 
and practice.5 This form of judg-
ment is grounded in the norms 
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core of her book, which presents, so 
to speak, the negative—that is, our 
world’s formation of our judgment 
as a lack, an orbit around a void 
that keeps us avoiding what we 
lack. But as Kierkegaard explored 
so well in Either/Or (1843), Stages 
on Life’s Way (1845), The Concept 
of Anxiety (1844), and The Sickness 
unto Death (1849), the ironic form 
of the judgment of the interesting 
is contained not in the quicksilver 
nature of its oscillation between 
boredom and fascination, but in the 
way it both covers and yet delivers 
over the capacity of each of us to 
develop moral conviction—that is, 
to become accountable and real, not 
fake or sold-out, people.
Ngai should return to the core 
of the subject, in Charles Larmore’s 
sense,7 a self capable of commit-
ment, of living for what she finds 
valuable. Here is idealism, in the 
moral sense. A being who comes 
to recall the helplessness and affec-
tionateness of living beings even 
through contact with representa-
tions in inert things and who is 
committed to the values of help and 
affection will see in the cute a dis-
torted or semiserious recollection 
of the innocent, who deserve protec-
tion from abuse. Someone who sees 
the interest in something and who is 
committed to truth (to getting to the 
bottom of why something is inter-
esting) will see in the merely inter-
esting an object of fascination to be 
pursued, deeper and deeper so long 
as it reveals, until she is absorbed 
us a particular kind of desperate 
subject, moreover, a subject who, 
if she were to be accountable to 
her moral relationships, might 
approach the experiences of what 
she calls “cute,” “interesting,” or 
“zany” differently. She might, for 
instance, see these aesthetic judg-
ments as moments on the way to 
reconnecting with what is innocent 
(and so to be protected), absorbing 
(so to be pursued regardless of the 
bored chatter around one), and out-
raging (and so to be taken as a cause 
of human dignity worth standing 
for). In effect, Ngai’s categories 
hold only if the subject using them 
is herself uncommitted to moral 
experience. This is a form of what 
Bernard Williams called “amor-
alism.” Ngai assumes “amoral” 
subjects.6 Isn’t that begging the 
question?
Still, as a way to show us the 
amoralism of capitalism, I believe 
that Ngai is right to begin with 
common forms of judgment that 
reveal fundamentally amoral or 
desperate subjects—subjects who 
have lost their grip on what mat-
ters in life. But she should not stop 
there. The omission of Kierkegaard 
from her discussion of the inter-
esting in chapter 2 is perhaps the 
only major scholarly oversight of 
her book. It is an interesting one 
because, if she were to have dis-
cussed Kierkegaard’s extremely 
thorough engagement with 
Schlegel and the Athenaeum circle, 
she would have had to modify the 
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cause of the material thing. Expanding 
the thing’s phenomenality to include 
its orbit of meaning, the way it makes 
meaning appear in its context, and so 
what context it carries with it, is to look 
toward Martin Heidegger’s transpo-
sition of Aristotle’s formal cause in 
Heidegger’s understanding of a thing: 
the constellation of a zone through 
which phenomena arise. Here, the 
zone is one of capitalist production and 
reproduction. Phenomena arise shaped 
by the contradictions of capitalism, car-
rying their form.
3. I use “alienation” in a different sense 
than Karl Marx did. I consider it a pos-
sible feature of the subject’s relation to 
what she values, not simply a laborer’s 
relation to the objects of his labor.
4. To be precise, she claims the interesting 
concerns the circulation of informa-
tion. Hence, she means to pick up this 
category as mirroring the information 
economy that has formed contempo-
rary capitalism, “postmodernism,” 
and global restructuring according 
to Manuel Castells in The Rise of the 
Network Society, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 2000). However, I 
think her claim can be broadened, as 
she sometimes speaks, to take in circu-
lation generally. It is the circulation of 
value—itself the primary kind of infor-
mation—that matters in capitalism.
5. Michael Thompson, Life and Action: 
Elementary Structures of Practice Life 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2008); Lauren Tillinghast, “The 
Thought of Art” (PhD diss., University 
of Chicago, 2000); and Karsten Harries, 
The Ethical Function of Architecture 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
6. Bernard Williams, Morality: An 
Introduction to Ethics, Canto Classics 
(New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 3–13. In my terminology, 
she assumes subjects without ethics, 
with the consequence that these subjects 
are then likely to be morally ambiva-
lent. The domain of the moral is the 
domain of interpersonal responsibility. 
in really understanding it.8 And 
the agent who witnesses the over-
wrought efforts of someone try-
ing to perform in capitalism and 
who is committed to human agency 
will see in that sight not zany com-
edy but potential tragedy. She will 
instinctively move toward action, 
challenging the dominance of eco-
nomic valuation and reasoning 
where agents become parodies of 
themselves running after produc-
tivity instead of having the oppor-
tunity to flourish.9
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer is Beamer-Schneider 
Professor in Ethics and associate professor of 
philosophy at Case Western Reserve University. 
He is the author of Solar Calendar, and 
Other Ways of Marking Time (Punctum, 
2017) and The Ecological Life: Discovering 
Citizenship and a Sense of Humanity 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) and coeditor 
of Ethical Adaptation to Climate Change: 
Human Virtues of the Future (MIT Press, 
2012). Forthcoming are Martha Nussbaum 
and the Politics of Wonder: On the 
Conditions of Democratic Life (Bloomsbury, 
2021), Involving Anthroponomy in the 
Anthropocene: Colonialism, Community 
Politics, and Responsibility (Routledge, 
2020), and The Wind ~ An Unruly Living 
(Punctum, 2019).
NOTES
1. Michael Clune, American Literature and 
the Free Market, 1945–2000, Cambridge 
Studies in American Literature and 
Culture (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 55–56. Clune 
is discussing Frank O’Hara’s “Personal 
Poem” (1964).
2. Aristotle would have said that the form 
of the angel—for instance, that worked 
into the iron press—was the formal 
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driven between things) of discussion, 
rather than with “dis-interest,” which 
Kant sticks to when conceptualizing the 
aesthetic mind. Ngai could write a short 
book—a long essay—examining just this 
tension in Kant and letting it develop 
in her own terms, probably away from 
Kant toward Hegel or Arendt. Here 
would be the subject standing in the 
locus of ethos giving sense and meaning 
to the world, to echo the wording of 
Anne-Christine Habbard.
9. To be fair to Ngai, she said in e-mail 
correspondence that my reading of 
what is unsaid in her book both coheres 
with what she would want to explore 
further and is something toward which 
she is initially disposed.
The ethical is broader, taking in all that 
is of value in terms of a good life.
7. Charles Larmore, The Practices of the 
Self (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010).
8. In what is one of her most interesting 
minor arguments that I have not gone 
into here, Ngai argues that the flip side 
of the merely interesting is the invitation 
to others to come join one in discus-
sion about what is interesting. This is 
the moment when she rearticulates, 
as a process, the sensus communis of 
Kant. The argument is ingenious on 
a number of levels, not the least in the 
way it notices the “purposive purpose-
lessness” of aesthetic judgment in Kant 
and aligns it with the “inter-esse” (being 
